The "pollution haven" hypothesis refers to the possibility that multinational firms, particularly those engaged in h ighly polluting activities, relocate to countries with weaker environmental standards. Despite the plausibility and popularity of this hypothesis, the existing literature has found little evidence to support it. This paper identifies four areas of difficulties that may have impeded the researcher's ability to uncover this "dirty secret." This includes the possibility that some features of FDI host countries, such as bureaucratic corruption, may deter inward FDI, but are positively correlated with laxity of environmental standards. Omitting this information in statistical analyses may give rise to misleading results. Another potential problem is that country-or industry-level data, typically used in the literature, may have masked the effect at the firm le vel. In addition, environmental standards of the host countries and pollution intensity of the multinational firms are not easy to measure. This study addresses these problems present in the earlier literature by taking explicitly into account corruption level in host countries and using a firmlevel data set on investment projects in 24 transition economies. With these improvements, we find some support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis, but the overall evidence is relatively weak and does not survive numerous robustness checks.
INTRODUCTION
The possibility that pollution-intensive multinational firms relocate to developing countries with less stringent environmental standards has been labeled as "pollution haven" or "race-to-thebottom" hypothesis. The logic sounds plausible: if it costs money to conform to more stringent environmental requirements in developed countries, profit-maximizing firms would want to relocate their production activities.
1 The believers abound. For example, the Sierra Club states that that "in our global economy, corporations move operations freely around the world, escaping tough pollution control laws, labor standards, and even the taxes that pay for social and environmental needs." The only trouble is to find convincing and supportive evidence. The empirical literature on this subject has largely failed to detect a significant correlation between the location decision of multinational firms and the environmental standards of host countries. This includes virtually all the papers surveyed in Dean (1992) and Zarsky (1999) . To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is a study by Xing and Kolstad (1998) which reports a positive associa tion between the amount of sulfur emissions in a host country and inflows of U.S. FDI in heavily polluting industries.
This evidence is based on a fairly small sample (no more than 22 observations in each regression), so its robustness is subject to debate. In any case, recent papers by Eskeland and Harrison (1997) , Letchumanan and Kodama (2000) and Wheeler (2000) again argue that the data does not support the "pollution haven" hypothesis.
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There are two possible ways to summarize the existing empirical studies. The first possibility is that the "pollution haven" hypothesis is after all just a popular myth that does not hold in reality. An alternative view is that the "pollution haven" hypothesis is valid but the empirical researchers have not tried hard enough to uncover this "dirty secret."
There are indeed several areas in which researchers face data difficulties that may have impeded their ability to expose the "dirty secret." First, there may be features of developing countries that deter FDI but at the same time are correlated with laxity of environmental protection.
A leading example of such a feature is a host country's weakness in public institutions, particularly the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption. Host country A may have less stringent environmental protection than country B, which might make country A more attractive than country B to foreign direct investment, particularly from the "dirty" industries. On the other hand, country A may also have a more severe corruption problem, which tends to discourage inward foreign investment, including those from the "dirty" industries. Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect corruption and laxity of environmental protection to go together, 4 so that statistical analysis on the effect of environmental policy on FDI that omits local corruption might fail to detect an effect. Several studies have demonstrated that corruption in a host country is a significant deterrent to inward FDI (Hines, 1995; Wei, 1997 Wei, , 2000a Wei, and 2000b and Smarzynska and Wei, 2000) . This points to the importance of controlling for the effect of corruption in examining the location choices of multinationals.
Second, as Zarsky (1999, p. 66 ) stated after surveying the empirical literature, "the quality of the evidence, both statistical and case study, is poor compared to the research needs. In terms of location decisions, most of the statistical studies rely on very aggregated data about 'industry choices' which shed little light on firms or production stages." This suggests the usefulness of employing a firm-level data set.
Third, it is very hard to measure the varying strength of environmental protection in different host countries. This difficulty is further exacerbated by the possibility that laws on the book may not be the laws that are actually enforced.
Fourth, assigning pollution intensity measures to production activities of different multinational firms is a very challenging task.
A combination of these difficulties may have prevented researchers from detecting a statistically significant effect of environmental protection on the location choice of multinational firms even if the "pollution haven" hypothesis is valid.
The objective of this paper is to tackle the problems in each of these four areas. First, we will explicitly take into account corruption in a host country as a possible deterrent to FDI (and hence as a compounding factor in the effect of environmental standards on FDI). Second, instead of using country-or industry-level figures, we will make use of a unique firm-level data set that describes the investment decision by 534 major multinational firms in 24 countries in Uzbekistan. Therefore, there is a reasonably big variation in the host-country environmental standard in our sample.
Fourth, we compute pollution intensity at the four-digit SIC industry level for all multinational firms in our sample, based on the data on actual pollution emissions and abatement cost of U.S. firms filed with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). We have the emissions data for 269 and the abatement cost data for 140 four-digit SIC industries in our sample. This is a labor-intensive task, but the payoff is an enhanced precision in assigning pollution intensity to the production activities of multinational firms. This is, however, still not a perfect measure. Note that we do not need to assume that the multinational firms in the source and host countries have identical pollution intensity. 6 Instead, what we need is a weaker assumption: the relative pollution int ensity between the overseas activities of the two multinational firms (e.g., Porter (2000) . 5 The actual number in the regressions is smaller due to missing values of various explanatory variables. 6 On the other hand, a recent survey of multinationals has indicated that in sixty-two percent of cases the development of environment, health and safety laws and regulations in the home country had motivated changes in company-wide environmental policies and programs (UNCTAD, 1992, p. 38) .
Dupont Poland and Nike Poland) is proportional to their pollution intensity at home (e.g. Dupont and Nike in the U.S.).
None of the previous papers in the literature has taken all of the above issues into account.
In that sense, our approach represents a significant improvement in the ability to uncover the "dirty secret," if there is any, on the relationship between environmental protection in a host country and the size and nature of its inward FDI. Rather than keeping the suspense, we spell out the bottom line right now. With various improvements relative to the previous literature, we find some support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis. To be more precise, the best evidence comes when participation in international environmental treaties is used as a measure of a host country's environmental standard. In this case, there is some evidence that investment from pollutionintensive multinational firms as a share of total inward FDI is smaller for host countries with a higher environmental standards. However, these findings do not survive various extensions and robustness checks. Therefore, our overall message is a caution against drawing strong conclusions based on selective evidence.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the methodology and the data employed. Section III discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes.
METHODOLOGY AND KEY VARIABLES

Empirical model
Let FDI jk be a dummy for FDI from multinational firm j to host country k. FDI jk takes the value of one if firm j has established investment or has concrete plans to invest in host country k, and zero otherwise.
Our strategy is to estimate some variant of the following probit specification:
where X j is a vector of variables describing the characteristics of firm j; H k is a vector of variables describing the characteristics of host country k other than its environmental standards; Z jk is a vector of variables describing the relationship between host country k and the source country where firm j originates from; and Γ j, Φ k and Π are vectors of parameters with corresponding dimensions. D j is an index of firm j's pollution intensity or "dirtiness," and E k is an index of host country k's environmental standards, possibly adjusted by the strength of enforcement. e jk is an iid normally distributed error term.
The parameter β captures a "volume effect:" a negative (or positive) β implies that a stronger environmental protection in a host country tends to discourage (or encourage) inward FDI.
The parameter γ captures a "composition effect:" a negative (or positive) γ implies that more (or less) pollution-intensive FDI would go to a host country with relatively weaker environmental standards. In other words, the "pollution haven" hypothesis can be represented by γ < 0.
Crucial to our empirical strategy is to have plausible measures of pollution intensity D j by multinational firms and of the strength of environment protection by host countries, E k . We will discuss the construction of these measures next.
Measuring pollution intensity of 4-digit SIC industries
We use two measures of pollution intensity of industries: one based on pollution emissions and one on abatement costs. 7 The first measure has been compiled from the Toxics Release would not change the conclusions of the paper. For the purposes of illustration, Table 1 lists the classification of industries at the three digit SIC level. In the regressions, however, classification at the four digit level has been used.
The main drawback of both indices is that they are based on the U.S. data. Thus we are assuming that pollution intensity of facilities set up by American investors overseas is the same as that of U.S. facilities, or (perhaps a weaker assumption that) the pollution intensity of the overseas production of two firms is proportional to their pollution intensity at home.
Further, it may be argued that the total amount of pollutants emitted does not take into account the differences in toxicity risks associated with different substances. Thus, an industry emitting a large quantity of a relatively harmless substance would rank as a greater polluter than another industry emitting a small quantity of a very potent pollutant. However, Dasgupta et al. (1998) have shown that at the aggregate level, there is no significant variation in ranking of industries based on total emissions and toxicity risks.
Strength of environmental standards and their enforcement
We measure the strength of environmental protection of the host countries in several different ways, which include:
(a) Participation in international treaties.
Treaties = participation in international treaties. Five international treaties were developed by the Economic Commission for Europe during the past twenty-one years. We take into account four treaties that came into effect before or during the time relevant for our data set (i.e., before 1995). Since changes in emissio ns of lead and CO 2 may be largely due to changes in output, we make an adjustment to take it into account. Namely, we define two additional variables:
Reduction in Lead Emissions Adjusted for Changes in GDP = percentage reduction in total
lead emissions plus percentage change in GDP during the corresponding period.
Reduction in CO 2 Emissions Adjusted for Changes in GDP = percentage reduction in CO 2
emissions plus percentage change in GDP during the corresponding period.
Variables Treaties and Standards reflect environmental standards on the book. Adjusted
Treaties and Adjusted Standards are standards on the book adjusted for the strength of enforcement.
The last five variables reflect the actual progress that has been made in lowering pollution emissions, thus they capture the combination of laws and their implementation.
All measures are standardized to have a zero mean and the standard deviation equal to unity. All measures are listed in Table 2 . Summary statistics are presented in Table 3a , while correlations can be found in Table 3b .
Measuring corruption in host countries
Corruption, by its very nature, is difficult to measure. Most of the available indices are based on subjective perceptions from surveys of firms or individuals. Wei (2000b) "Is it common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular, 'additional' payments to get things done?" The respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption on a one-to-six scale. The WDR corruption index is based on the country average of the individual answers.
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For both corruption indices, the original sources are such that a higher number implies lower corruption. To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, they are re-scaled in this paper so that a high number now implies high corruption.
Each measure covers a different subset of countries for which we have investment data, thus we use a composite corruption index derived by Wei (2000b) . Since both indices come from surveys with similar methodologies and similar questions and are highly correlated (0.83), Wei combined them using the following procedure: (1) use GCR as the benchmark; (2) compute the ratio of GCR to WDR for all countries that are available in both GCR and the WDR; and (3) for those countries that are covered by WDR but not GCR (which is relatively rare), convert the WDR rating into the GCR scale by using the ratio in (2).
Other variables
Following the existing literature on determinants of FDI, our regressions also include proxies for market size (GDP), labor costs (GDP per capita) and corporate tax rate.
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The dependent variable comes from a unique firm-level data set based on the EBRD Foreign Investment Survey conducted in January 1995. A brief questionnaire was sent to about 9,500 firms from all over the world asking them about their planned or undertaken investment projects in Our empirical analysis focuses on investment in manufacturing facilities since investment in service sectors or in distribution alone is not likely to have a significant environmental impact. As the objective of this study is to explore the impact of government policies on the magnitude and nature of FDI inflows, firms in the oil, gas and coal sector, which are likely to be attracted to natural resource endowments, are excluded from the estimations.
Information on firm characteristics, such as size and R&D intensity, is from Worldscope.
The proxy for regional experience comes from the survey. The distance between the source and host countries has been calculated by the authors. See Appendix I for a detailed description of all variables.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Basic Regressions
We begin the test of the "pollution haven" hypothesis with regressions employing participation in international treaties as a proxy for environmental standards in a host country. The results, presented in terms of marginal effects, can be found in Table 4 . As stated in the last section, the coefficient on the environmental regime (labeled Env Regime) captures a volume effect -the (marginal) effect of the strength of environmental protection in a host country on the overall volume of inward FDI. The coefficient on the product of the host country's environmental regime and the 11 The source countries in the sample listed in order of imp ortance include: United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, Finland, Switzerland, South Africa, Sweden, Ireland, Australia, Norway, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, New Zealand, Austria, Singapore, Portugal, Argentina, C olombia, Greece, Philippines, South Korea and Hong Kong, China. 12 117 of the survey respondents were chosen for in-depth interviews whose results are discussed in Lankes and Venables (1996) . 13 Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were virtually closed to foreign investment before 1989 (see Meyer, 1995; Dunning and Rojec, 1993; Hunya, 1997) .
investing firm's pollution intensity captures a composition effect -whether stronger environmental protection discourages the investment from more polluting industries by a greater amount.
The results provide support for the composition effect but little evidence of the volume effect. In the first column, we find that the interaction term between environmental regime and the emission index bears a negative and statistically significant sign, as predicted by the hypothesis.
Environmental standards alone, however, do not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of investment.
The volume effect (measured by a host country's environmental standards) and the composition effect (measured by the product of a host country's standard and a multinational firm's pollution intensity) are correlated. To give the "pollution haven" hypothesis the maximum benefit of doubt, we re-estimate the first regression dropping the measure of environmental standards but leaving its interaction with investor pollution intensity. The interaction terms remains significant.
As the introductory section stated, omission of the corruption variable in the previous empirical papers may have been one reason why host country environmental standards did not appear to matter for inward FDI. To make an assessment of this possibility, we estimate a model in which host country corruption is dropped (but both environmental standards and the interaction terms are included). As we can see in the third column, the interaction term gives evidence of the composition effect but no volume effect is present (i.e., environmental standards remain insignificant).
When we take into account enforcement of the international treaties (columns 4-6), again we find support for the composition effect but mixed evidence on the volume effect. Recall that enforcement is proxied by the number of environmental NGOs in a host country relative to the population size. The NGO variable is not available for all countries, and thus it restricts our sample to Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). 14 Overall, the results indicate that foreign investors in polluting industries are more likely to enter countries with less stringent environmental standards, but this is not the case for foreign investors in general.
The other variables have the expected signs. We find that larger and less R&D-intensive firms are more likely to undertake FDI. 15 This is also the case for investors with previous regional experience. As far as host country characteristics are concerned, the data indicate that large countries and those located close to the investor's home country are more attractive to FDI. On the 14 The number of active NGOs could be affected by the extent of political freedom. This is, however, unlikely to be an issue in the subsample of transition economies for which are using the NGO data.
other hand, high corporate taxes and a greater incidence of corruption discourage foreign investors.
GDP per capita does not appear to be significant in most regressions.
Robustness Checks and Extensions
To check the robustness of our findings, we present results from regressions using alternative measures of environmental regulation (Table 5) . No support is found for the "pollution haven" when the raw EBRD's rating of the air and water standard is used, but there is some evidence in its favor if the EBRD rating is adjusted for enforcement. Further, there is no support for the hypothesis when reductions in emissions are employed as a proxy for environmental regime. This is the case for the raw reduction figures as well as for reductions adjusted for output changes.
Thus, the empirical evidence of the "pollution haven" hypothesis is not robust to using different proxies for environmental standards in host countries.
As another robustness test, we re-estimate the model using abatement cost index to capture a firm's pollution intensity (Table 6 ). When this change is made, the evidence in favor of the hypothesis disappears almost completely. The interaction term is not significant in any of the seven regressions, indicating the there is no composition effect. The volume effect can be detected only in one out of seven cases.
Since our measures of investor pollution intensity have been calculated using the U.S. data, one could argue that this calls for limiting our sample to U.S. firms only. When we re-estimate our model on this subsample (see Table 7 ), the evidence in favor of "pollution haven" hypothesis is fairly weak. The coefficient of environmental regulation is significant and negative only in two cases and none of the interaction terms is negative and significant. Note that in this subsample tax rates do not have a significant effect on investment decision, which may be due to tax credits U.S.
companies receive for tax payments made abroad.
Further, we re-estimate our model employing the Neumann index as a measure of corruption incidence in host countries. The regression results, presented in Table 8a , give some support to the composition effect but no to the volume effect. As before, the composition effect is present when environmental regime is proxied by participation in international treaties and emission standards (both laws on books and laws adjusted for enforcement), but not when reduction in emissions are emp loyed.
Finally, Table 8b presents the results with both Neumann index and abatement cost index.
In this case, hardly any support is found for the hypothesis.
We have performed further robustness checks that are not presented here. For instance, we narrowed the sample to include only firms in highly polluting industries (emissions or abatement index equal to two) and estimated the original model as well as the model without interaction terms.
The results produced gave very little support to the "pollution haven" hypothesis.
As an alternative way of adjusting the measures of environmental standards for enforcement, we divided them by the corruption index. This adjustment, however, did not alter the qualitative results since the coefficients of interest rema ined insignificant in almost all the regressions.
Finally, we restricted our sample to include only firms that undertook at least one investment in the region, thus limiting the number of zeros on the left-hand side. Again, the results led us to the same conclusions.
Summing up, despite our best efforts we were unable to find more than a weak support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis. Our data indicate that host country environmental standards have very little impact on FDI inflows both in terms of the volume and in terms of composition. We do not find robust evidence of foreign investment in pollution-intensive industries flocking to countries with weak environmental regimes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper makes an effort in four different areas to enhance our ability to detect the possible "dirty secret" that multinational firms flock to countries with weak environmental protection and that this is particularly the case for more pollution-intensive industries. Our effort includes (a) taking into explicit account the effect of host country corruption, (b) using firm-level rather than country-or industry-level data, (c) employing a variety of measures that capture the strength of environmental protection in host countries, and (d) constructing a measure of pollution intensity at the 4-digit industry level.
With these improvements, we find some support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis. In particular, the most supportive evidence comes when a country's environmental standard is measured by its partic ipation in international environmental treaties. In this case, investment from pollution-intensive multinational firms as a share of total inward FDI is lower for host countries with a higher environmental standard. However, the support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis is not robust to various sensitivity checks.
Our findings are still subject to caveats. We have a relatively small number of host countries so the variation of environmental protection may be limited. The measures of pollution intensity and of the strength of environmental protection can still be too noisy to allow us to obtain precise estimates. Future work will, hopefully, improves on these dimensions.
APPENDIX I
Firm specific variables used in the empirical analysis come from Worldscope, which is a commercial database providing detailed financial statements, business descriptions, and historical pricing information on thousands of public companies located in more than fifty countries. They pertain to 1993 or the closest year for which the information was available and refer to worldwide operations of each firm. Below we present a more detailed description of the variables. Ø Value of index Description 1 Maximum permissible concentration (MPC) system in place, broadly based on the former Soviet system 2 New system is being introduced, either as an evolution of MPC or in order to meet EU requirements 3
Essentially new standards system is in place, often following EU requirements Distance, GDP, GDP per capita and firm size are used in the log form. All results are presented in terms of marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. Standard errors, listed in parenthesis, have been corrected to take into account possible correlation between observations for the same country. 
